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 Appeal from the Eighth Judicial District Court's entry of final judgment pursuant 
to a jury verdict against attorneys Mainor and Harris. Respondents and cross-appellants 
Philip Nault and Wendy Nault, as co-guardians of the person and estate of Jason Nault, 
cross-appeal from a Eighth Judicial District Court’s order offsetting the final judgment by 




 Reversed.  The Supreme Court of Nevada held that: 1) the district court order 
approving the medical malpractice case was voidable but ratified by conduct; 2) the 
parents were precluded from bringing legal malpractice action on the grounds that wife 
was unjustly enriched in medical malpractice settlement; 3) the parents were not 
judicially estopped from bringing legal malpractice action; 4) the attorneys' alleged 
violation of ethics rules did not create a cause of action; 5) the incompetent son was 
entitled to be present during jury selection in legal malpractice trial; and 6) damages 
evidence was insufficient to support finding of legal malpractice. 
  
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Jason Nault was rendered in a permanent vegetative state after anesthesia 
equipment failed during his hernia surgery. His pregnant wife, Louise Nault, brought a 
medical malpractice claim on behalf of herself and Jason. Louise sought the advice of 
attorney Joe Rolston, for whom she had worked as a secretary. Rolston agreed to assist 
Louise but advised her that, as medical malpractice was outside of his area of expertise, 
she should hire an attorney with experience in this area. Louise and Rolston entered into a 
contingency fee agreement. 
After Louise and Rolston interviewed several personal injury attorneys, Louise 
decided to retain W. Randall Mainor and the law firm of Mainor & Harris. On June 13, 
1994, Louise, Mainor and Richard A. Harris signed a contingency fee agreement, which 
established that Mainor and Harris would receive 33.3 percent of the gross recovery prior 
to suit and 40 percent after suit was filed. The agreement incorporated the previous 
retainer agreement with Rolston. 
In March 1996, after nearly two years of contentious litigation, the parties 
participated in a full-day settlement conference which resulted in a settlement of 
approximately $17 million.  After settlement, the parties allocated the settlement to 
provide for Jason, his wife Louise, and their daughter.  These ends were met by 
purchasing various annuities.  The attorney fee agreements provided for fees totaling 40 
                                                 
1 By Timothy J. Geswein 
2 Maior v. Nault, 120 Nev. Adv. Rep. 84, 101 P.3d 308, 311 (Nev. 2004). 
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percent of the settlement, or approximately $6.8 million.  After these payments, a surplus 
of approximately $2.5 million was, with everyone’s agreement, given to Louise. 
On April 11, 1996, Mainor petitioned the district court for approval of the 
compromise of Jason's claim. The petition specifically set forth the details of the annuity 
purchased for Jason’s care.  Judge Gates, who had been the trial judge in the underlying 
tort case, found that the compromise of the claims fair and reasonable. Accordingly, the 
district court approved the compromise, as well as the payment of attorney fees. 
Louise's relationship with Jason’s parents deteriorated after the settlement because 
the parents believed Louise was mismanaging Jason's estate because several checks to 
Jason's nurses had been returned for insufficient funds. Ultimately, Louise relinquished 
guardianship and the Naults released Louise from all other claims. On May 11, 1998, the 
Naults signed a stipulated settlement agreement, in which they acknowledged the 
compromise of Jason's claims in the prior tort action and Louise's acceptance of the 
compromise on behalf of Jason, Rene and herself. They also acknowledged that the lump 
sum payments and annuities had been allocated to Louise, Jason and Rene. Finally, they 
expressly agreed not to contest the final settlement of the tort action or any other issue 
relating to the $17 million settlement. On June 9, 1998, the district court entered an order 
approving the settlement between Louise and the Naults. 
Soon after settling with Louise, the Naults, as guardians, retained an attorney and 
commenced the present action against Louise, Rolston, Mainor, Harris and the law firm 
of Mainor & Harris. The complaint essentially alleged that the attorneys should have 
recognized that they had a conflict of interest by representing both Jason and Louise, that 
the attorneys and Louise conspired to deprive Jason of his money and that Jason received 
insufficient compensation in the settlement. 
The Naults settled with Rolston for $400,000. They settled with Louise for no 
money, in spite of the fact that they alleged that Louise had breached her fiduciary duties 
to her husband and conspired to obtain a larger portion of the settlement money than 
Jason. In the second settlement with Louise, the Naults obtained a divorce for Jason from 
Louise, Louise withdrew an objection she had filed to the Naults' guardianship 
accounting, Louise dismissed a complaint she had filed against Jason's parents and Kelly 
Nault to recover large amounts of money she had allegedly loaned to them and Louise 
renounced any claims she might have had to any money recovered in the present action. 
 The action proceeded to trial against Mainor and Harris. After a twelve-day trial, 
the jury awarded $3.25 million to Jason's estate against Mainor and Harris. The district 
court's final judgment offset the jury's award by $400,000, which reflected Rolston's 
settlement with the Naults. Mainor and Harris subsequently moved for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), or alternatively, to modify the judgment to preclude 
prejudgment interest. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion. Mainor and 
Harris appeal from the final judgment, and the Naults cross-appeal from the order 











1. The district court's order approving settlement of the medical malpractice case 
was voidable but ratified by conduct. 
 
Mainor and Harris assert that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the present 
action because the district court's settlement approval order in the medical malpractice 
action was valid and was never set aside, precluding the present action as an 
impermissible collateral attack on a final judgment. The Naults contend that the 
settlement approval order was void for three reasons: (1) lack of relevant material 
information, (2) due process violations, and (3) lack of jurisdiction. 
 The court dismissed the Naults’ first reason by noting that the court will not 
disturb a district court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence and 
that the transcript of the settlement approval hearing satisfied the court that the district 
court had sufficient information to determine that Jason's needs were met. 
 The court dismissed the Naults’ second reason by noting that procedural due 
process is violated when the adjudicator, not the guardian, has a conflict of interest. In 
this case, there is no evidence that the district court was biased toward any party.  
Further, even if Louise's guardianship of Jason created a conflict of interest, there was no 
evidence at the settlement approval hearing that Jason's needs would not be fully met by 
the settlement agreement. The substantive due process claim lacks merit because 
substantive due process concerns the adequacy of the government's reason for depriving a 
person of life, liberty or property. It is not meant to protect against alleged fraud upon the 
court by private individuals. 
 The court dismissed the Naults’ final reason by noting that the family court has 
exclusive jurisdiction over guardianships and that the guardian of the ward's estate must 
seek the family court's approval before agreeing to a settlement on behalf of the ward. 
Hence, at first blush, it appears that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
approve the settlement with respect to Jason. However, when there is a colorable case for 
jurisdiction, a district court order is merely voidable rather than void. Here, because the 
district court had jurisdiction to try to judgment the underlying medical malpractice case 
and to enter a judgment based upon the verdict, the court must have reasonably believed 
that it could finalize the global settlement agreed to by all of the parties. No one objected 
to the district court's finding that the settlement was fair and reasonable. Moreover, orders 
of the district court are presumptively valid if regular on their face. On its face, the 
district court's order appears to be a regular settlement approval order. Hence, the order 
was voidable, but not void. 
 The Naults, on Jason's behalf, never attempted to set aside the judgment pursuant 
to for fraud, lack of good faith or because the order was allegedly void. Subsequently, in 
the legal malpractice case, the district court determined that the district court in the 
medical malpractice action had subject matter jurisdiction to approve the settlement. This 
finding was proper because the Naults never moved to set aside the settlement approval 
order and did not contest the global settlement of $17 million. We conclude that the 
settlement approval order was voidable, but, since the Naults never attempted to set it 
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aside and in fact did not contest approval of the global settlement but only the allocation 
to Jason, their conduct ratified the order's validity. 
 
2. Parents are precluded from bringing legal malpractice action on the grounds that 
wife was unjustly enriched in medical malpractice settlement. 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court held that the Naults were precluded from bringing a 
legal malpractice claim because the Naults expressly agreed not to contest the final 
settlement of the tort action or any other issue relating to the settlement, and that this 
agreement was approved by the district court. Further, the Naults approved of the 
settlement amount and complain only that the division of the proceeds was improper. The 
court holds that to permit the Naults to pursue an independent action as they have done 
would be unfair for two reasons. First, the Naults are accepting a portion of the settlement 
approval that benefits them but are bringing suit to upset the portion they now oppose 
without attempting to modify the settlement compromise. Second, the distribution of a 
large amount of the proceeds to Louise is left standing without any attempt to recoup the 
allegedly excessive amount paid to her. The Naults actually compounded this situation by 
giving a full release to Louise for what appears to be very little compensation. The net 
result is that the Naults are suing their attorneys for a portion of the settlement previously 
approved without taking any action to revise the settlement approval and recoup the 
amount they claim due from Louise, the party who was allegedly unjustly enriched. The 
Nevada Supreme Court did not believe that this is reasonable or equitable. 
  
3. Parents are not judicially estopped from bringing legal malpractice action. 
 
Mainor and Harris argued that the judicial estoppel doctrine precludes the legal 
malpractice action because the doctrine's purpose is to suppress fraud and prevent a party 
from changing his or her position depending on the demands of each particular case 
concerning the subject matter in controversy. Mainor and Harris assert that the Naults 
cannot pursue the legal malpractice claim because the guardianship settlement agreement 
the Naults submitted to the district court under oath absolved Louise of all claims relating 
to the medical malpractice case and guardianship.  
 The Nevada Supreme Court held that this argument lacked merit for three 
reasons. First, the protection of the judicial system from parties asserting inconsistent 
positions assumes that the inconsistent position was successfully asserted in a prior 
judicial proceeding. Because the district court or jury does not determine the facts when a 
settlement agreement is presented to the court, it does not constitute a judicial 
endorsement of a party's claims. 
Second, the mere fact that the Naults knew that Mainor, Harris and Rolston were 
the attorneys in the medical malpractice claim did not make the attorneys a beneficiary of 
the settlement agreement because the settlement did not contemplate releasing the 
attorneys from any liability for alleged legal malpractice. 
Finally, Mainor and Harris's argument that the Naults essentially sought to modify 
the medical malpractice settlement in their legal malpractice claim hinges on the 
attorneys' characterization of the Naults' claim as an attempt to redistribute the medical 
malpractice settlement proceeds. This characterization was wrong because a legal 
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malpractice claim focuses on whether the attorneys adhered to the standard of care in 
their representation of the case, which is different from the underlying medical 
malpractice claim. 
 
4.  The admission into evidence of specific ethical rules permissible but attorneys'  
     alleged violation of ethics rules did not create a cause of action. 
 
Mainor and Harris contend that the district court erroneously instructed the jury 
on specific professional rules, over their objection, because an alleged violation of the 
rules of professional conduct does not create a civil cause of action, as set forth in the 
preamble to the American Bar Association Model Rules, which may be used for guidance 
in applying the Nevada rules. Mainor and Harris contend that once the jury heard these 
rules and opinions regarding violations of the rules, it would be virtually impossible for 
the jury to decide the case based on the appropriate standard of whether an attorney failed 
to use the skill, prudence and diligence that a lawyer of ordinary skill and capacity would 
have used.  
The Nevada Supreme Court chose to adopt the majority rule that professional 
rules of responsibility do not create a private right of action, but are relevant to the 
standard of care. Because the Nevada Supreme Court Rules reflect a professional 
consensus of the standards of care below which an attorney's conduct should not fall, it 
would be illogical to exclude evidence of the professional rules in establishing the 
standard of care.  
 
5. Jason Nault was entitled to be present during jury selection in the legal 
malpractice trial. 
 
The record reflects that the Naults sought to have Jason present during jury 
selection and closing arguments. Mainor and Harris sought to exclude Jason's presence 
entirely because Jason's presence created unfair prejudice. Mainor and Harris contend 
that Jason's presence was unhelpful to the jury's determination of the facts and was 
intended solely to generate tremendous sympathy for Jason and his parents and 
undermine Mainor and Harris's right to a fair trial. At a hearing on Mainor and Harris's 
motion in limine, the district court ruled that Jason would be allowed to be present during 
jury selection but not during closing arguments.  On appeal, Mainor and Harris contend 
that the district court improperly denied their motion in limine seeking to exclude Jason's 
presence during trial. 
The Nevada Supreme Court held that a party's right to be present at his trial is not 
absolute but rather must be balanced against the opposing party's right to an impartial 
jury. Where the party's presence might elicit so much sympathy from the jury that the 
jury would likely disregard its duties as instructed and find for the party based on 
sympathy alone, the opposing party's right to a fair tribunal would be violated. The 
Nevada Supreme Court stated that it believed that a party should be permitted to attend 
his or her trial, or every segment of it if the trial is bifurcated, even though that 
attendance is very limited.  In this case, Jason’s presence was limited and not unfairly 
prejudicial to Mainor and Harris. 
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6. Evidence regarding damages evidence was insufficient to support finding of legal 
malpractice. 
 
Mainor and Harris assert that there was no legal or evidentiary basis for the jury's 
determination that Jason was entitled to a larger share of the settlement proceeds because 
the Naults failed to show proximate causation. Mainor and Harris contend that the 
evidence regarding damages was too speculative to constitute substantial evidence to 
support the jury's $3.25 million verdict against them.  
The Nevada Supreme Court found that the expert testimony about damages was 
highly speculative and lacked foundation in that it was not based on any treatise of law or 
on Nevada law regarding apportionment of settlement proceeds between an injured 
spouse and his wife.  The Nevada Supreme Court found it was not unreasonable for the 
attorneys to rely upon the doctors' predictions regarding Jason’s life expectancy in 
establishing the annuity to provide for his needs. Finally, Wendy Nault, Jason's mother 
and co-guardian, conceded that, although little was left over per month from Jason's 
annuity, all of Jason's needs had been met by his annuity.  
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court erroneously admitted the 
speculative damages testimony and, therefore, no substantial evidence supported the 
jury's finding that Jason, through his guardians, met his burden of proof with regard to the 




The Nevada Supreme Court held that substantial evidence did not support the damages 
element of the legal malpractice claim and therefore the district court's judgment was 
reversed. 
 
